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HOW FAR IS 
TEHRAN WILLING AND 
ABLE TO PLAY EITHER 
A CONSTRUCTIVE OR 
DESTRUCTIVE ROLE IN 
THE STABILlSATION 
AND RECONCILIATION 
PROCESS IN 
AFGHANISTAN? 
Watching today's west-ern media, it seems that Iran is not only a 
pan of the so called :Axis oflJvil', 
it's the epicentre of it: being 
largely portrayed as a state that 
is an irrational actor, extreme-
ly guided by ideology. on track 
to acquire nudearweapons by 
any means. In addition Iran is 
characterised as a state which 
is one of the prime supponers 
of terrorism worldwide, the 
'invisible hand' behind all kinds 
of insurgencies, des1abilising 
notonlythe Middle East but its 
South Asian neighbourhood as 
well, To call its image dubious 
is an understatement. Be it as 
it is, such categorisations do not 
help assess Iran 's foreign poli-
cy in an objective manner, 
especially not with regards 10 
Kabul. Furthermore, this depic-
tion distracts from the impor-
tant questions which should be 
asked: How far is Tehran will-
ing and able to play either a 
constructive or destructive role 
in the stabilisation and recon-
ciliation p rocess in 
Afghanistan? And is Iran's 
Afghan policy an outcome ofa 
coherent, comprehensive and 
rational concept or deternlined 
byshon-tenn responses to cer-
tain developments? Does the 
foreign policychange from con-
ciliation to confrontation under 
the current Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad affect 
Iran-Afghanistan relations? 
Basically one must state, that 
Iran is increasingly gaining 
imponance in the whole region. 
Some analysts even argue that 
Iran is the real beneficiary of the 
US/NATO militaryengagements 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. First, 
they brushed (v"o major region-
al adversaries of Shia Teheran 
aside - the Iraqi Ba'th and the 
Afghan Taliban - both Sunni -
which were seen as threats to 
Iran 's political and socio-cultur-
al existence. Second, the subse-
quent {)(M'er vacuums that were 
created due to the disastrous 
post-invasion periods in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. lead to 
tremendous difficulties for the 
US /NATO, thus paving the way 
for Iran to extend its activities 
and influence in the respective 
countries. Being shocked by the 
pace at which the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was ousted and 
Baghdad was captured, Iran's 
security circles were obviously 
pleased to observe the limitations 
of foreign (US) military opera-
tional capacities in its sphere of 
influence. This was only a boost 
for the self-confidence oITehran's 
religious as well as political lead-
ers and strategic thinkers but also 
for Iran's regional prominence, 
Consequently, Iranians contin-
ue - despite increasing interna-
tional pressure and isolation - to 
actively safeguard their interests 
in Afghanistan; a phenomenon, 
which is without doubt justified 
to a large extent. However, in 
spite the fact that Teheran's 
objectives have changed over 
time as the political landscapes 
beyond its eastern borders have 
been in tunnoil it is difficult to 
identify immediate and concrete 
goals or a dearly defined agen-
da. Nevertheless a set of core 
matters detennining the bilater-
al relations between Thheran and 
Kabul remain resilient. These 
cover the respective goals such 
as stability at the Iranian-Afghan 
border, a Teheran-friendly gov-
ernment in Afghanistan, push-
ing back the strong influence of 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 
order 10 prevent an encirclement 
oflran by a potentia/ "Sunni wall" 
(l raq-Pakistan-Afghanistan) as 
well as avoiding dominance of 
its arch-rival, the USA in the 
region. Havingthis in mind, Iran 
is especially focused on ensur-
ing national and regional secu-
rity, fighting terrorism, prevent-
ing the production and trade of 
narcotics, economic cooperation, 
and finding a solution for the 
refugee problem. Most s ignifi-
cant forTeheran is the issue of 
security confronting the coun-
try's leadership with a difficult 
ideational and strategic dilem-
ma. On one side it seeks a stable 
Afghanistan, which isguaranteed 
at the moment bya strong pres-
enceofforeign troops. but on the 
other side, the presence of US-
troops in its immediate neigh-
bourhood is for obvious reasons 
a thorn in the sides of Teheran's 
decision-makers. Thelikelihood 
of a long term presence of US 
troops and maintenance ofbases 
in Afghanistan casts a shadow on 
the relations bet\'o'een Kabul and 
Teheran. Therefore, it is no sur-
prise that on each occasion Iran 
is demands the total withdrawof 
all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. The Ahmadinejad 
administration is convinced that 
panicularly the presence of US 
troops only complicates the 
Afghan scenario and that region-
al problems have 10 be solved by 
the regional countries them-
selves. FQreign presence would 
only aggravate the situation. 
Another area of concern is 
extremist militancy. Iran is con-
fronted with local and cross-bor-
der terrorism such as militant 
groups operating from bases in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, sup-
porting anti-government activi-
ties in the Iranian province of 
Sistan and Baluchestan, 
Nevenheless, like Pakistan, Iran 
also gets the blame by several 
analysts of being ambivalent in 
its 'war against terrorism', 
Although no definite proof fo r 
these accusations is made pub-
lic, there is no doubt that inter-
action bet\'o'eenTehranand mil-
itant outlets like Al-Qaida exist. 
Unambiguously Iran has its inde-
pendent agenda when it comes 
tofightlngterTOrism If the regime 
in Teheran feels th reatened by 
terrorists they act cooperatively 
especially in regional frame-
works. However, it seelils that the 
Iranian strategic establishment 
is convinced it can gain a strate-
gic advantage if it tries to instru-
mentalise terrorism, often in 
order to maintain a balance of 
power be(V,'een the different fac-
tions in Afghanistan. In this con-
text, combined with having a 
long history of exercising influ-
ence, one can also imagine that 
• 
there is periodical, low scale 
Iranian support for militant 
oppositional forces, even for the 
adversarial Taliban in order to 
showthe US thatTeheran is able 
to challenge them in the region 
at any time. 
Additionally, the fact that 
Afghanistan is one of the largest 
producers of opium and heroin, 
in other words after the produc-
tion of narcotics were more or 
less eliminated, in the last years 
the country regained the label of 
being a 'drug economy'. This is 
creating serious problems for 
Iran, not only because Iran has 
the highest rate of opium con-
• 
sumers but also because it suf-
fers from the extensive drug traf-
fickingwhich uses Iran as a gale-
way 10 Middle East and Europe. 
Security forces for example are 
permanendyinvolved in violent 
clashes with drug trafficke rs, 
leading to the death of around 
4000 officers in the last three 
decades. Furthermore, police and 
army are increasingly getting 
involved in narcotic related cor-
ruption. 
Another burden of bilateral 
relations is the issue of Afghan 
refugees on Iranian territory. 
Since the beginning of the Soviet 
Invasion in 1979, Iran has been 
confronted with a massive influx 
of refugees. Hosting more than 
one million of them - some 
sources claim two million 
- Afghanis tan has one of lhe 
greatest refugee populations 
worldwide without receiving any 
adequate recognition and sup-
port from the international com-
munity. ln addition, Tehran has 
to deal with a tremendous 
amount of economic migrants 
offering cheap labour, creating 
domestic tensions bet\'o'een 
unemployed Iranians and 
Afghans. Iran's policy of forced 
repatriation of the economic 
migrants leads to additional seri-
ous confrontations between 
Tehran and Kabul An area of suc-
cess is doubtless Teheran's eco-
nomic assistance in western 
Afghanistan, building massive 
infrastructure in order to inte-
grate the bordering Afghan 
provinces into the economic sys-
tem of Iran. There is a general 
agreement among analysts that 
Teheran's primary goal of devel-
opment activities for Afghanistan 
Is to ensure its own political influ-
ence through economic inter-
weavement and to weaken the 
ties between Kabul and the areas 
of its western territory, However, 
Iran is not trying to provoke 
Kabul too much and applies - at 
least lemporarily- more tactical, 
conciliatory than confrontation· 
al, aggressive rhetoric in order to 
achjeve is major goal, the estab-
lishment of establishjng a stable 
Afghanistan which is strong 
enough to ensure peace and 
security but also weak enough to 
give in to Iranian influence. 
To sum up, it seems that Iran's 
policy towards Kabul is rather 
incoherent and short tenn ori-
entated, responding to certain 
political events and trends. Until 
now Iran did not develop a sus-
tai nabl e, cohesive overall strat e-
gy or fundamental doctrine 
regarding its eastern neighbour. 
Despite the fact that some 
Iranian interests conflict with 
each other, one can state that in 
general, the country shares 
numerous common interests 
with the international commu-
nity in Afghanistan, A fact which 
is often overlooked in the light of 
the Iran-US deadlock created by 
the nuclearconflictaswell as by 
antagonistic perceptions of lib-
eral democracy and human 
rights, Ho\vever, these bilateral 
tensions seriously hamper a 
cooperative and collective 
approach of all actors involved, 
including significant regional 
players such as Iran. 
Subsequently Iran only partly 
utilises its capacities in playing 
a constructive role inAfghanistan 
which would be beneficial for all. 
Therefore it is in the very own 
interest of all aclOrs involved to 
intensify the dialogue with 
Teheran and include the coun-
try in developing a comprehen-
sive regional solution for 
Afghanistan, 
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